Duquesne Law Review
Volume 14
Number 4 Symposium on Energy and the
Environment: Is Coal the Key to the Solution?

Article 8

1976

Some Fundamental Problems Involved in Stationary Source
Compliance under the Clean Air Act
James C. Carroll

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James C. Carroll, Some Fundamental Problems Involved in Stationary Source Compliance under the Clean
Air Act, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 639 (1976).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol14/iss4/8

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Some Fundamental Problems Involved in Stationary
Source Compliance Under the Clean Air Act
James C. Carroll*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Clean air regulation is nothing new. More than 700 years ago, the
burning of sea-coal in London was punishable by death.1 Although
air pollution laws in the United States have yet to make industrial
emissions of various chemical compounds a capital offense, a clean
air bill recently approved by the Senate Public Works Committee
would provide for the economic death of many businesses by requiring mandatory delayed monetary compliance penalties, which
would exceed the net income of certain companies,' for failing to
comply with state implementation plan (SIP) limitations for particulates and sulfur dioxide by January 1, 1979, and denying judicial
relief if such particulate-or sulfur dioxide-emitting company is
unable to post a bond assuring payment of the penalty sum.'
Attempts to control air pollution in the United States commenced
nearly a century ago with the adoption of local smoke emission
control ordinances and expanded with the adoption of comprehensive state air pollution control acts following World War II.' Unlike
another so-called quality of life area such as job safety where Congress adopted the Walsh-Healy Act prescribing health and safety
standards for workers in government contract work5 and then allowed that Act to generally remain unenforced,' the federal government refrained entirely from acting on the subject of air pollution
until after the Korean War. It is not clear whether the federal government refrained from acting in the field of air pollution control
because it saw no problem, or because it saw a problem but believed
* A.B., Yale University (1961); J.D., University of Minnesota (1964); attorney, Ohio Edison Company, Akron, Ohio.
1. Note, Considerationsof Technologicaland Economic Factorsin Air Pollution Control,
44 U. CIN. L. REV. 573 n.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Considerations].
2. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text infra.
3. Id.
4. See Note, Considerations,supra note 1, at 574-84.
5. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
6. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH AcT OF 1970, at 15 (1971).
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it was a matter of local concern only, or because it saw a problem
but believed it lacked the power to act effectively to resolve such
problem, or because it saw a problem but was afraid of the danger
to the economy during war or recession if it allowed inexperienced
and newly charged administrators to tinker with various pollution
control ideas. For whatever reason Congress refrained from involving the federal government in air pollution matters, a case could,
and still can, be made for the proposition that local selection of air
pollution control techniques is more effective, less harmful to the
economy, and can be designed to better achieve the health goals in
a manner which the finite resoulwes of this nation can support than
some uniform plan which is superimposed throughout the nation
regardless of differing local conditions or health need therefor.
In any event, Congress proceeded to initiate and expand the air
pollution control role of the federal government in the aftermath of
the Korean War. Federal intervention began with the adoption of
The Air Pollution Control and Assistance Act in 1955,1 which authorized air pollution research. Thereafter, federal air pollution control expanded as Congress adopted additional legislation, including:
an act authorizing research of, and a report on, motor vehicle discharges in 1960;8 the Clean Air Act of 1963, authorizing legal action
by municipalities, states, and the federal government to control
intrastate and interstate air pollution;9 a 1965 Act requiring standards for certain motor vehicle emissions beginning with the model
year of 1969;' 0 and the Air Quality Act of 1967, authorizing more
comprehensive control of air quality control regions and federal authority to establish ambient air quality standards and control plans
to achieve such standards if the states failed to act."
The Air Quality Act of 1967 required the federal government to
study potential air quality control regions throughout the nation,
consult with various governmental officials, and then to designate
air quality control regions for which the states would adopt ambient
air quality standards and control regulations to achieve such standards.1 In view of this slow and cumbersome procedure, it is hardly
7. Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, § 1, 69 Stat. 322.
8. Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960).
9. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965).
11. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485.
12. Air Quality Act of 1967, §§ 107, 108, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485, as amended
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970) and (Supp. V, 1975).
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surprising that by 1970 only ten states had approved ambient air
quality standards and that no state had approved a plan by which
such standards might be achieved.' 3 Nevertheless, Congress became
concerned with the slow pace of clean air program development
under the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures which had
resulted under the legislation which it had prescribed earlier." This
congressional concern resulted in the adoption of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970,' which constituted a significant increase in
federal air pollution control involvement.
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Clean Air Act) authorized
the federal government, by way of the Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to designate which
pollutants were harmful,'9 to determine what ambient concentrations of designated pollutants must be achieved to protect public
health and welfare,"' to determine the best system of emission reduction to be installed on new stationary sources of pollutants after
taking cost into account,' 8 to define and determine emission standards for hazardous pollutants,'9 to approve or disapprove stateprepared implementation plans designed to attain and maintain the
federally prescribed ambient air quality standards, 20 and to prepare2
and/or enforce such implementation plans if the states fail to act. '
The current trend toward increasing federal involvement in air
pollution control matters cannot be denied. The definition of clean
air has become a federal function.2 2 The determination of new stationary source and hazardous pollution emission limitations has
become a federal function. 23 The supervision of SIP operation has
of unenforced
become a federal function. 24 And federal enforcement
25
function.
federal
a
become
SIP provisions has
13.
14.

See 116 CONG. REc. 32914 (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

-

(1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5356, 5360.

15. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)).
16. Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970).
17. Id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
18. Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
19. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970).
20. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
21. Id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
22. See note 17 supra.
23. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Clean Air Act § 110(c), 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(c), -8 (1970), as amended (Supp.
V, 1975).
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Continuous congressional displeasure with the results produced
by whatever legislation is in force coupled with a congressional disposition to continue substantial legislative tinkering is resulting in
a current trend in which no clean air legislation probably will remain law for long. The fact that Congress adopted five separate air
pollution laws between 1960 and 1970 undercuts any assumption
that Congress will long refrain from adopting new legislative prescriptions for air pollution matters."8 Indeed, both Houses of Congress are currently considering significant substantive changes to
the present Clean Air Act.27 What effect the uncertainty created by
this ever-fluid legislative situation will have upon the economy is
outside the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that a
fluid legislative base must result in a changing regulatory situation
to the detriment of long range planning by American business and
the corresponding ability of business to forecast and satisfy future
market demand.
This article will discuss the basic requirments of the Clean Air
Act, some of the problems for stationary sources which have developed in the implementation of this Act, and will briefly cover some
of the significant proposed amendments currently under consideration in Congress.
II.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT

Perhaps the best interpretive guide as to how the Act is intended
to function is provided by the clear and express regulatory concepts
contained therein. There are three fundamental regulatory concepts
contained in the Act.
First, the EPA Administrator is charged with the obligation to
establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) requisite
to protect public health and welfare within four months of the en28
actment of the Act.
Second, within nine months thereafter, the states are required to
develop and submit, to the EPA Administrator, SIP's which will
attain and maintain the primary ambient air quality (healthrelated) standards within three years of the Administrator's SIP
plan approval and which SIP's would attain and maintain the sec26.
27.
28.

See notes 8-11 & 15 supra.
See, e.g., note 147 infra.
Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
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ondary ambient air quality (welfare-related) standards within a reasonable time after SIP plan approval.29
Third, the EPA Administrator is required to establish standards
of performance for new stationary sources upon determining the
degree of emission reduction achievable by application of the best
adequately demonstrated system of emission reduction after taking
cost into account,30 and to establish national emission limitations
for air pollutants that he determines are hazardous.3 '
Furthermore, the Administrator is charged with additional obligations apparently considered necessary by Congress in performance of the fundamental obligations. These obligations would include the task of reviewing and approving or disapproving the
SIP's" submitted following promulgation by the Administrator of
NAAQS3 and SIP guidelines for six air pollutants (sulfur oxides,
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides) for which air quality criteria have
been developed. Requisite elements of each plan, in addition to
attainment of the NAAQS within specified time limits include,
inter alia, "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be
necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or
secondary standards, ' 3 the establishment of ambient air quality
monitoring systems, 3 a review procedure for the location of sources
to which a new source standard will apply,3 8 and provision for plan
revision as may be necessary. 37 Finally the Act provides the EPA
Administrator with authority to act if the states fail to adopt proper
SIP's,38 and to federally enforce the requirements of an approved
SIP, including criminal penalties for violation of requirements inci9
dent to federal enforcement.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970).
Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1975).
Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970).
Id. § 110(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(C) (1970).
Id. § 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D) (1970).
Id. § 110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(H) (1970).
Id. § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
Id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES

Considering the three fundamental regulatory concepts only, the
Clean Air Act is rather easily understandable. The goal was to be
defined by the federal government, existing source control methodology was to be determined by the states, and new source and
hazardous source emission limitations were to be determined by the
federal government.
Unfortunately the simplicity of the Act applies only in the most
abstract sense. For when one attempts to implement this Act in
actuality, ambiguity arises. Just a few of the unanswered questions
which Congress transferred to the EPA and the states for determination included:
(1) What constituted "clean air"?
(2) What constituted an "air pollutant" or "air contaminant"?
(3) What methods of control were permissible to achieve the
undefined clean air goal?
(4) What cost burdens should be borne by respective existing
sources in any clean air program?
(5) What regulatory cost burdens should be borne by existing
sources in the economy in relation to the benefits resulting from
such regulations?
(6) What regulatory cost burdens could be borne by the private sector of the economy and still enable the private sector
to make a profit, maintain present employment opportunities,
and create new employment opportunities which are necessary
to economic health?
(7) What type and level of regulation would be acceptable to
the EPA? To state pollution control agencies? To environmental groups? To the industry most directly affected by the choice
of regulation?
There was, and is, no national consensus of opinion nor knowledge
as to the answers to the foregoing questions. Given the absence of a
broad national consensus with respect to clean air matters and the
restricted time period for implementing the Clean Air Act, principles representing conflicting viewpoints quickly appeared. First, the
EPA Administrator, primarily charged with implementing the Act,
had to interpret the Act and to immediately implement the Act by
adopting NAAQS and exhort the states to develop SIP's to attain
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and maintain such standards 0 with very little time to observe a
reasoned national consensus form.' Second, state officials had to
develop SIP's that would attain and maintain the NAAQS and that
would also meet with the Administrator's approval.2 When the
Administrator promulgated SIP guidelines in August 1971, barely
five months remained for state officials to analyze these guidelines
and develop SIP's for their entire states which would be equitable
for each individual stationary source.13 Third, environmental groups
were interested in attaining and maintaining NAAQS but favored
application of stringent and inflexible constant emission controls for
existing stationary sources regardless of actual need therefor," and
in promoting a significant deterioration concept for new sources
which limited or prevented economic growth without reference to
prescribed NAAQS. 45 Finally, industry desired air pollution control
flexibility which would allow the attainment and maintenance of
prescribed NAAQS by means of the most cost-effective methods
applicable for a given source including tall-stack dispersion techniques, intermittent controls, and emission limitations." Moreover,
industry desired that it be permitted a fair hearing and adequate
opportunity to analyze and comment on proposed controls-on
which there was no unanimity as to need or severity-before final
40. 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1975).
41. NAAQS were first promulgated on April 28, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971), and SIP's
were to be submitted within 9 months thereafter. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). However, the
Administrator did not promulgate SIP guidelines until August 14, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 15486
(1971).
42. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 41 supra.
44. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 421
U.S. 60 (1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
45. Prior to the approval of SIP's by the Administrator, the Sierra Club sought injunctive
relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 304(a)(2) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970), to prevent approval of those plans which did not
provide for nondegradation of existing clean air. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253 (D.D.C.), afJ'd mem., 4 Env. Rep. Cas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom., Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). See also Terris,
Environmental Critique, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 217, 220 (1974).
46. Clean Air Act § 307(b) requires review of the EPA Administrator's action in approving
a SIP within 30 days of such approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970), as amended (Supp. V,
1975). Thereafter the SIP is federally enforceable under § 113. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), as
amended (Supp. V, 1975). Fear that a source might be unable to comply with applicable
SIP provisions and never receive a fair hearing, or any hearing, in which to contest such
provisions increased after a company failed to file a § 307 review petition and found itself
unable to obtain such a hearing. Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
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controls were adopted which might force the shutdown of existing
sources. 7
A.

The Definition of "Clean Air"

Congress did not define "clean air" but provided that the EPA
Administrator should provide this definition by way of determining
the NAAQS which should be "based upon" existing air quality criteria" which had been prepared by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the most part under the Air Quality Act of
1967.11 These existing criteria documents were basically a literature
search of various health studies throughout the world and I do not
believe any attempt was made to standardize monitoring of various
health parameters or ambient pollutant concentrations as reported
in these health studies. 5° The conclusions contained in various of
these criteria documents generally relied heavily on epidemiologic
studies contained therein with most of the authors' qualifying remarks omitted and the NAAQS as finally promulgated 5' also relied
heavily on such epidemiologic studies-with the accompanying lack
of standardization of health parameters and ambient pollutant
monitoring-in order to arrive at the low values contained in such
standards. For example, in 1974, after several years of research in
improving SO, ambient monitoring equipment," the EPA stated
that a measured 24-hour ambient SO reading of 100 ug/M 3 indicated that the actual SOI concentration could be expected to lie
between 53 ug/M 3 and 147 ug/M 3 due to the inadequacy of present
monitoring equipment tofdistinguish between such small increments. 53 If the available SO 2 monitoring equipment was that inade47. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,
481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
48. Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
49. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR
CARBON MONOXIDE (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA
FOR HYDROCARBONS

(1970); U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA

FOR PARTICULATE MATTER (1969);

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,

Am QUALITY

(1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, AIR
QUALITY CRITERIA FOR SULFUR OXIDES (1969, rev. EPA ed. 1973); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR NITROGEN OXIDES (1971).
50. See also Address by Megonnell, A Look at Air Pollution Standards: Electric Industry
Viewpoint, Proceedings Air Quality: Standards and Measurement Speciality Conference,
Mid-Atlantic States Section Air Pollution Control Association, Oct. 1974.
51. 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1975).
52. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 50, appendix A (1975).
53. 39 Fed. Reg. 31003 (1974).
CRITERIA FOR PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS
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quate in 1974, it must have been at least that inadequate, or more
so, in the epidemiologic studies contained in the Air Quality Criteria
for Sulfur Oxides "4 and incorporated into the annual average
NAAQS for sulfur dioxide of 80 ug/M 3 . In the case of the NAAQS
for nitrogen dioxide, the low ambient values promulgated were apparently based on one epidemiologic study in Chattanooga, Tennessee, which employed a monitoring technique which has since been
discredited and will be withdrawn by the EPA.5
In view of the foregoing uncertainties regarding the epidemiologic
studies contained in the various criteria and upon which the
NAAQS were based, it is a wonder that only one serious legal challenge was ever made with respect to the NAAQS-challenging the
basis and validity for annual and 24-hour secondary ambient air
quality standards for sulfur dioxide 5"-with the EPA Administrator
ultimately withdrawing the secondary ambient standards for sulfur
dioxide through rulemaking.57 This is the only revision which has
been adopted by the EPA Administrator in the values originally
promulgated as the NAAQS in 1971.18 A tendency appears to exist
at EPA to treat the present NAAQS as sacrosanct, 5 and only a
portion of the criteria document for sulfur oxides has been revised
since EPA took over the task of clean air enforcement six years ago. 0
Because of the goal function which the NAAQS have under the
54.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR SULFUR OXIDES

(1969, rev. EPA ed. 1973).
55.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR NITROGEN OXIDES

(1971).
56. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
57. 38 Fed. Reg. 25678 (1973).
58. Compare 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1975) with 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1971).
59. In his opening remarks at the Environmental Protection Agency Public Hearing and
Conference on the Status of Compliance with Sulfur Oxide Emission Regulations by Power
Plants in Arlington, Virginia, on October 18, 1973, Administrator Russell E. Train stated:
To provide perspective for this hearing I want to review the development of requirements under the Clean Air Act of 1970. The law required EPA to establish ambient
air quality standards for significant air pollutants. One of these is sulfur oxides. These
air quality standards, which were promulgated in April of 1971, are designed to protect
the public health and welfare. The need for these standards has been supported by
subsequent research efforts. The time established by the Act for debate and appeal of
these standardshas long since passed. Hence, the appropriatenessof these standards
is not an issue of this hearing. At this timfe we are most concerned with the achievement
of the primary ambient air quality standards, the standards which protect the public
health.
Transcript at 5-6 (emphasis added).
60. See generally publications cited note 49 supra (relating to effects on vegetation).
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present national air regulatory scheme, it is most important that
these ambient standards be sound, proper, and scientifically incontrovertible. I suggested two years ago that it would be preferable for
Congress to separate the regulatory and scientific determinations
functions, both of which are presently vested in the Administrator
with respect to ambient air quality standards, by assigning the function of determining ambient standards to an independent agency
while allowing the regulatory functions to continue to be performed
by the Administrator.' Inasmuch as EPA has conducted little ambient research for purposes of revising existing criteria and preparing new criteria in the past five years, competition between research
and regulatory needs for existing funds and operational priorities
exists within EPA itself," and serious allegations of systematic dis61.

Carroll, Air Quality Control in the '70s: Industrial Viewpoint, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES
214 (1974).
62. Prepared Statement of Dr. Stanley M. Greenfield, President of Greenfield, Attaway
& Tyler, and former Assistant Administrator for Research and Development of the EPA,
before the Subcommittee on ihe Environment and the Atmosphere of the House Committee
on Science and Technology on Research and Development Relating to Sulfates in the Atmosphere, July 11, 1975. With respect to the competition between research and regulatory needs
within the EPA, Dr. Greenfield made the following observations:
Research in an operational agency is always a difficult and uncomfortable activity.
This is primarily because in the yearly competition for funds the operational arm of
the agency views itself as carrying out a clearly defined near-term mandate for the
current budget period. In contrast to this the research function with its more distant,
less clear goals is viewed as an unnecessary drain on limited resources and in many
ways a hindrance to the accomplishment of the "more important" agency functions.
This conflict is even further amplified in an operational regulatory agency, where the
political measurement of its effectiveness is very closely tied to the day to day public
view of its enforcement activities. In this case, the research function is not only viewed
as utilizing needed current resources in order to accomplish future goals, but in addition it is seen as being constantly in the position of posing uncertainties and constraints
in the technical base that underlies the desired regulatory action. The result is a
constant battle in which the research function is continuously put in the position of
having to request sufficient time and resources to provide an information base that is
adequate to permit defensible, rational regulatory activities. From the regulatory side
of this conflict emerges a resentment of the need to "waste" funds on non-regulatory
activities and a frustration over the inability of the research activity to provide the
required information on demand.
The accomplished compromise to these opposing viewpoints is a research function
that is never sufficiently funded nor given adequate time to acquire the required
knowledge and a regulatory function that never has adequate information to make the
decisions on which it acts. I should hasten to add at this point that this condition is
too often not the complete fault of the regulatory agency, but rather may be due to
the fact that unreachable or unreasonable implementation dates are legislated in an
understandable attempt to produce quick positive results. While laudatory in intent,
LAWYER 203,
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tortion have been raised with respect to the limited health research
which EPA has conducted, "3 it would appear even more appropriate
today to separate the scientific function for determining NAAQS
from the EPA regulatory function by assigning this scientific function to an independent agency.
B.

New Source Standards of Performance

The EPA Administrator's second primary responsibility under
the Act is to promulgate new source standards of performance for
stationary sources based upon the best adequately demonstrated
system of emission reduction after taking the cost of the system into
account. " In 1971, the Administrator determined that the availability of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) equipment, or "scrubbers,"
had been adequately demonstrated for application on large new
coal-fired steam generators. " This determination, coupled with the
Administrator's SIP guideline finding that FGD systems had also
been demonstrated as adequate for existing coal-fired fuel burning
units," sparked the greatest controversy which has embroiled EPA
and industry to date.
The Administrator's determination concerning FGD systems on
new coal-fired steam generators was based almost entirely upon the
alleged success of the FGD systems serving the Meramac No. 2 unit
of Union Electric Company and the Lawrence No. 4 unit of Kansas
Power and Light Company.67 The FGD system serving the Meramac
such action tends always to produce a chaotic response, and frequently can result in a
counter-productive effort.
This conflict that classically exists between research and regulation was experienced
by me during my entire tenure as Director of Research and Development for the
Environmental Protection Agency. This does not mean that I did not fully understand
that regulatory decisions must take into account other factors in addition to the technical. Rather my experience was that too frequently, the technical reality did not have
an adequate impact on the decisions that were made.
Id. at 1-4.
63. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Environment and the Atmosphere of the Science and Technology Comm. and the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce on Oversight of Scientific Validity of the Environmental Protection Agency's Community Health and Environmental Survey Study, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-332 (1976); Los Angeles Times, Mar. 2, 1976, pt. II at 1, col. 1; Los Angeles
Times, Feb. 29, 1976, pt. I at 1, col. 1.
64. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
65. 36 Fed. Reg. 15704, 15706 (1971) (now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (1975)).
66. 36 Fed. Reg. 15486, 15496 (1971).
67. 37 Fed. Reg. 5767 (1972); ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE OF AIR PROGRAMS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED NEW-SoURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (1971).
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No. 2 unit was abandoned after attaining only intermittent operation shortly after the Administrator's FGD system determination
was promulgated." The FGD system serving Lawrence No. 4 unit
has experienced generally poor operating results to the present day
although somewhat more favorable results were achieved when the
unit served by the FGD system was converted from high-sulfur to
low-sulfur coal in 1974-75.11 Unfortunately the original FGD system,
which the EPA Administrator believed adequately demonstrated
the workability of FGD systems, is presently being replaced since
the high corrosion levels which have occurred during scrubber oper7
ation have caused this scrubber to "consume" itself. 0
The Appalachian Power Company, a subsidiary of American
Electric Power Company, filed a petition to review the new source
SO; emission limitation determination in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals under section 307 in Essex Chemical Corp.
v. Ruckelshaus.7' Although it remanded the case to EPA on other
grounds, the court found that the EPA Administrator's new source
68. Address by John K. Carpenter, Union Electric Central Laboratory, OperatingExperience With Limestone FurnaceInjection- Wet Scrubbing, Electrical World Technical Conference on Sulfur in Utility Fuels: The Growing Dilemma, in Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 25-26, 1972.
69. Prepared statement of Daric Miller, Vice President, Kansas Power & Light Co.,
Recent Scrubber Experience At The Lawrence Energy Center, presented at the Symposium
on Flue Gas Desulfurization sponsored by the EPA, in New Orleans, Louisiana, Mar. 8-11,
1976, wherein he stated:
This cleaning requirement lessened a little into 1974 when for economical reasons
in the cost of coal, we completed negotiations for a supply of low sulfur coal from SE
Wyoming for these units. We started receiving this coal: 10,000 BTU/#, .5% sulfur and
11% ash in the fall of 1974 and had phased out all the SE Kansas coal by late spring
1975. The bypass duct system in the Lawrence 4 unit was removed at this time due to
complete deterioration.
The operation of the scrubber system on the Wyoming coal has proved to be somewhat better and more economical due to a lesser amount of sulfur removal required.
The scrubber system is still operating in the high solids mode as an SO and particulate removal system. Our normal manual cleaning requirements have been reduced to
2-4 hour shifts per scrubber per week.
Id. at 7.
70. After stating that conversion to low-sulfur coal has enabled the Lawrence No. 4 unit
scrubber to operate, Mr. Miller continued:
We are presently replacing this successful scrubber system because since 1968 in modifying and revising the scrubber modules and operating many hours at corrosion levels
that were bad, we actually consumed the physical scrubber plant. Now that we have
achieved-at the Lawrence Energy Center and under the conditions of operation
there-a mode of operation that we can maintain, we have had so much deterioration
of vessel and equipment that we must build a new system to have one.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
71. 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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emission reduction standard for sulfur dioxide, based upon the Meramac No. 2 unit and Lawrence No. 4 unit FGD systems, did not
represent "a clear error of judgment" and could not be overturned
by the court." This decision appears to indicate that the court did
not take cognizance of any facts occurring after the Administrator's
promulgation of the new source sulfur dioxide emission limitation;
so the court did not consider that the FGD system serving Meramac
No. 2 unit was abandoned after intermittent operation and that the
FGD system serving Lawrence No. 4 unit ultimately consumed itself.
A few months after the District of Columbia Circuit decision in
Essex Chemical, EPA admitted that FGD systems serving Meramac No. 2 unit and Lawrence No. 4 unit were unsuccessful.7 3 Although this was noted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in a later case holding that FGD systems were not technologically
or economically feasible, ' 4 the failure of the District of Columbia
Circuit to reverse the EPA Administrator's new source emission
limitation for sulfur dioxide has resulted in presumably upholding
the legal requirement that new coal-fired electric utility boilers
must comply with a sulfur dioxide emission limitation of 1.2 pounds
of sulfur dioxide per million Btu of heat input.7 5 This apparent legal
requirement has been instrumental in forcing the present and
planned installation of FGD systems on equipment with a total
estimated electric generating capacity of 42,128,000 kilowatts to
date.78 Based upon a conservative cost estimate for FGD system
72. Id. at 440.
73. Testimony of Frank Princiotta, EPA Office of Research and Development, at the
Environmental Protection Agency Public Hearing and Conference on the Status of Compliance with Sulfur Oxide Emission Regulations by Power Plants, in Arlington, Virginia, Nov.
1, 1973, at 2827, 2834-36.
74. In Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), the court stated in part:
The Court is cognizant that in Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus the District of
Columbia Circuit, in approving the federal emission standards for new sources of
pollutants held that the availability of flue gas desulfurization devices for coal-burning
power plants was adequately demonstrated. That decision was based on a different
record from that presently before this Court. In promulgating those emission limitations the Administrator had pointed primarily to the Meramac No. 2 station of the
Union Electric Co. and the Lawrence No. 4 unit of the Kansas Power and Light Co.
as demonstrating the availability of scrubber technology. The Arlington hearings,
however, established that neither of those is currently regarded as a successful operation, and the Meramac station has been abandoned.
Id. at 1199 n.36 (citation omitted).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (1975).
76. Prepared Statement of Pedco-Environmental Specialists, Status of Flue Gas Desul-
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installation of $100 per kilowatt of installed electric generating capacity,77 and assuming this construction will proceed as planned,
the Essex Chemical decision will have been instrumental in forcing
a capital investment by the American electric power industry of
more than $4.2 billion to date.
The fact that the Administrator's decision on the new source sulfur dioxide emission limitation was wrong has been aptly demonstrated not only with respect to subsequent events at Meramac No.
2 unit and Lawrence No. 4 unit but whenever EPA has attempted-either directly or indirectly by furnishing technical expertise-to support a state-adopted sulfur dioxide emission limitation
in an adversary proceeding where the affected industry was given a
full and fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who contended
that scrubbers have been adequately demonstrated or where the
affected industry has been granted an opportunity to develop a full
and complete record on the issue. 8
furization Systems in the United States, presented at the Flue Gas Desulfurization Symposium sponsored by the EPA, in New Orleans, Louisiana, Mar. 8-11, 1976, at 2.
77. The present costs for installing the FGD systems to serve two 825 megawatt new coalfired units at the Bruce Mansfield Plant in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, is more than $243
million, more than $140 per kilowatt. Ohio Edison Company Exhibit No. 3, filed with the
EPA on January 23, 1976, in response to the EPA-Proposed Sulfur Dioxide Control Strategy
for Ohio, 40 Fed. Reg. 52410 (1975).
78. Three times in three separate forums in the past three years, industry has successfully
proven that FGD systems are inadequate. In 1973, in Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Power
Co., 5 Env. Rep. Cas. 1373 (Pa. C.P. Lawrence Co. 1973), aff'd, 12 Pa. Commw. 212, 316 A.2d
96 (1974), aff'd, 461 Pa. 675, 337 A.2d 823 (1975), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania attempted to force Pennsylvania Power Company to install an FGD system on its New Castle
plant by means of an action to imprison and fine its president until the company committed
itself to the installation of an FGD system which the company believed to be undemonstrated
and unworkable. The trial court found that FGD systems had not been adequately demonstrated or proven reliable, dismissed the Commonwealth's contempt action, and made the
following conclusion as to those who would attempt to force the installation of unproven FGD
systems through the establishment of an overly restrictive sulfur dioxide emission limitation:
Without in any way reflecting on the Department of Environmental Resources field
enforcement or legal enforcement officers, and considering only those persons within
the hierarchy of the Department who were responsible for the enactment of the sulfur
dioxide control regulations, we apparently have a classic example of the validity of the
Peter Principle.
5 Env. Rep. Cas. at 1378 (emphasis added).
In 1974, the Ohio electric utilities, In re Consolidated Electric Utility Cases, Hearing Panel
Report Case No. 73-AV-122 (Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 1974), litigated the issue
as to whether FGD systems were technically and economically feasible before a panel of three
hearing examiners of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. At the conclusion of this
hearing, which included testimony from numerous U.S. EPA officials and required nearly
three months, the hearing panel found: "Flue gas desulfurization is not a presently available,
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The new source sulfur dioxide emission limitation controversy
indicates the weakness contained in the Clean Air Act for procedurally overturning incorrect decisions of the EPA Administrator.
Under section 307(b) of the Act, most rules promulgated by the
Administrator may not be contested unless a petition to review the
promulgation of the rule is filed within 30 days from the date of
promulgation. 9 Now consider, if you will, the position of the Administrator in any rulemaking proceeding. The Administrator is often
in a position to gather rulemaking data of prima facie sufficiency
to meet either the arbitrary and capricious judicial review test,'" or
the substantial evidence judicial review test' to support a predetermined rulemaking decision before proposing rulemaking to the public. The Administrator could then allow only a minimum 30 or 60
day period for public comments. Any appeal of potentially unreasonable rulemaking must be based on the record generated during
this comment period. If the record generated in this comment period
is insufficient to overturn the Administrator's prima facie record
under the appropriate standard of judicial review, the affected
sources will lose their appeal. Upon failing to file a petition to review
or upon losing the appeal subsequent to filing a petition to review,
the affected sources may not again raise the issues involved in the
rulemaking unless based solely on grounds arising after the time for
review has expired."
The only defense against any unreasonable rulemaking under sectechnologically feasible method of So, control which may be employed by the Ohio electric
utilities." Conclusion of Law No. 15.
In 1975, Ohio Edison Company and Pennsylvania Power Company, together with Duquesne
Light Company in Pennsylvania, presented a record developed over more than one year to
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for determination as to the technological and
economic feasibility of the Pennsylvania air implementation plan including the issue of
whether FGD systems were adequately demonstrated and could be required on coal-fired
boilers of the respective companies in Pennsylvania. In Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d
1186 (3d Cir. 1975), the court remanded the record to the EPA for further consideration of
the economic and technological feasibility of the Pennsylvania sulfur dioxide emission limitation which would require installation of FGD systems after finding the Administrator's approval to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In so doing, the court expressed
skepticism about the possibility of such a showing. Additionally, the Third Circuit cast
serious doubt on the prior holding of Essex that FGD systems were available technology as
mentioned above. See note 74 supra.
79. Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
81. Id. § 706(2)(E).
82. Clean Air Act §§ 307(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857h-5(b), (c) (1970), as amended (Supp.
V, 1975).
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tion 307(b) is for the source owner to stay attuned to the potential
rulemaking of the EPA Administrator before it is proposed and to
retain expensive expert consultants to perform defensive research
before the potential rulemaking is actually proposed. This would
enable the source owner to prepare his case when the short comment
period on the proposed rulemaking commences and preserve a
sound record for review of unreasonable rulemaking. Obviously, the
expense of this defense can be better borne by large source owners
than by small source owners. In fact, since defensive research appears to be the only defense to unreasonable rulemaking, serious
doubt exists as to whether small source owners who cannot afford
such defensive research will survive this decade of environmental
rulemaking.
C.

State Implementation Plan Application To Existing Sources

1. Necessary Variance Flexibility
As mentioned above, environmental groups desired that the SIP's
contain stringent and inflexible constant emission controls with respect to existing source emissions, whereas industry desired that the
SIP's contain air pollution control flexibility which would allow the
attaixnment and maintenance of prescribed NAAQS by application
of the most cost-effective method for any given existing source including tall-stack dispersion techniques, intermittent controls, and
emission control techniques. Each state needed to develop a SIP
which, hopefully, would not destroy the state's economy and which,
certainly, had to meet with the approval of the EPA Administrator. 13 Initially, EPA did not foreclose the use of flexible air pollution
controls for existing sources. The guidelines required that the SIP's
classify the state into priority regions for the purposes of plan development and evaluation. 4 The EPA Administrator further required
that nothing in the federal SIP guidelines should preclude state
consideration of the cost-effectiveness of alternate control strategies, state consideration of the social and economic impact of the
control strategy, or state adoption of non-uniform control strategies
within a control region. 5 Moreover, the EPA Administrator provided that "topography, spatial distribution of emissions, or stack
height . . . shall be considered in developing the control strategy."8"
83.
84.
85.
86.

Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
36 Fed. Reg. 15486, 15488 (1971) (now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1975)).
36 Fed. Reg. 15486, 15487 (1971) (now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1975)).
36 Fed. Reg. 15486, 15490 (1971) (now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.13(e)(2)(ii) (1975)).
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Finally, the EPA Administrator approved SIP's containing procedures which provided for variances from emission limitations where
such source would not prevent the attainment and maintenance of
87
NAAQS.
Unfortunately the states had only about 5 months in which to
develop their respective SIP's after the federal SIP guidelines were
issued"' and many states quickly adopted EPA's "worst region"
approach89 whereby the worst measured concentration within the
state for each pollutant was located and then the proportional rollback model was employed to establish the emission limitation necessary to bring the area of this worst pollution concentration into
compliance with the NAAQS. This "worst" case emission limitation
was then applied throughout much or all of the remainder of the
state regardless of actual ambient need therefor10 Briefly, the proportional rollback model employs a straight mathematical calculation to determine a constant emission limitation."' This proportional
rollback model does not take into account the height of the emission
source, area topography or spatial distribution of emissions as required by the federal SIP guidelines. Moreover, EPA has conceded
that the worst-region-proportional rollback methodology for establishing emission limitations is a relatively crude strategy with a
potential for expensive overkill regulations. 2 Nevertheless, worstregion-proportional rollback methodology to determine SIP emission limitations has been employed in some states. This methodology has resulted in the adoption of existing source emission limitations for sulfur dioxide which were more stringent than the best
system of emission reduction which the EPA Administrator determined had been adequately demonstrated for installation on new
93
sources.
87. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 10872-73, 10891 (1972) (Massachusetts and Rhode Island
SIP's). See also Lunenberg, Federal-StateInteraction Under the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 637 (1973).
88. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
89. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.3, .13 (1975).
90. See, e.g., Ohio Air Pollution Regs. AP-3-11, AP-3-14.
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.13(e)(2)(i) (1975). If the worst ambient concentration for a specific
pollutant in the "worst region" is 100, the background concentration for such pollutant is 0,
and the NAAQS for such pollutant is 50, the emission limitation developed would require a
50% reduction in emissions, and such "worst region" emission limitation would then be
applied throughout the state where a less stringent emission limitation would prevent violation of the NAAQS.
92. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1976, at 35, col. 1.
93. See, e.g., Ohio Air Pollution Reg. AP-3-14; 25 PA. CODE § 123.11 (1976).
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Because of the haste with which the SIP's were prepared and the
"overkill" shortcuts which were incorporated into some of them,
some states provided their environmental agencies with variance
flexibility to "fine-tune" unnecessarily stringent and hastilyadopted emission limitations. 4 The flexibility afforded by the use
of variance procedures to allow emissions in excess of categorical
limitations was challenged in a series of lawsuits brought by the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC)5 ' The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, agreeing with NRDC, generally
found that variance flexibility or relief from categorical emission
limitations did not exist outside the postponement provisions of
section 110(f)96 and so modified the EPA Administrator's approval
of state plans containing variance procedures. Although all of these
courts found that state variance procedures were impermissible in
the period following NAAQS compliance date, the Fifth Circuit
went even further to hold that variance from categorical emission
limitations could not even be issued in the so-called "preattainment" period under the Act. 7
After the First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits had generally
supported the SIP "inflexibility" approach promoted by NRDC, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected any "preattainment, post-attainment" period variance distinction and held
that a variance from a SIP for a particular source could be issued
by the state-either before or after the NAAQS compliance
date-where such variance would not prevent the attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS15
The Supreme Court reviewed the Fifth Circuit decision which had
been appealed by EPA to vindicate the state's authority to issue
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912 (1971); OHfo REv. CODE § 3704.03(H) (Supp. 1975). See also
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974).
95. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd and remanded
sub noma., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
97. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 402 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd and remanded sub nori., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S.
60 (1975).
98. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court held that utilization of the variance procedure of § 110(f) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c5(f) (1970), was not required where only minor variances which did not prevent the attainment or maintenance of national ambient standards were involved.
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variances during the "pre-attainment" period, and ultimately resolved the variance flexibility issue. In adopting the approach followed earlier by the Ninth Circuit,99 the Supreme Court in Train v.
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. 10 found that the Fifth Circuit had erred in finding that the postponement provision of section
110(f) afforded the only relief available from the categorical emission limitations contained in the SIP's, that the original EPA position that revisions which did not prevent the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS could be issued either before or after the attainment date under section 110(a)(3) 011 of the Act was reasonable, and
that the Fifth Circuit was without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 02 The Court in Train found:
The Agency [EPA] is plainly charged by the Act with the
responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards.
Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met ....
The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom
of a State's choices of emission limitations if they are part of a
plan which satisfies the standards of § 110(a)(2) . . . . [S]o
long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient
air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission
limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.'0
The Court also stated:
We also believe that Congress, consistent with its declaration
that "[elach State shall have the primary responsibility for
assuring air quality" within its boundaries, § 107(a), left to the
States considerable latitude in determining specifically how
the standards would be met. This discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emission
limitations.1°1
99. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974).
100. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
102. 421 U.S. at 98-99.
103. Id. at 79.
104. Id. at 86-87.
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2. ConsiderationOf The Technological And Economic Feasibility
Of State Implementation Plan Provisions
Although the Supreme Court has determined in Train that variances from categorical emission limitations which do not prevent
the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS may be issued as section 110(a)(3) revisions, and partially upheld industry's desire and
need for flexible pollution control, a second fundamental concern of
industry is the extent to which the state, the EPA Administrator,
and the courts should take account of the technological and economic feasibility of the air pollution controls adopted as part of the
SIP. There is no real dispute that the technological and economic
feasibility of proposed air pollution controls should be considered
before the state adopts the final SIP.'05 The serious inquiry is actually two-fold, namely: (1) whether the EPA Administrator must
consider the technological and economic feasibility of the proposed
controls prior to federal approval of the respective SIP's as federal
standards, and (2) whether the technological and economic infeasibility of the final SIP controls may be asserted as a defense in a state
or federal enforcement action.
This issue is an appropriate subject for an entire article and a
detailed analysis of this issue is outside the scope of the present one.
Nevertheless, a few observations should be made. First, there are a
number of participants in the environmental arena who proffer the
opinion that once a SIP is adopted by a state, the technological and
economic feasibility of various plan provisions thereafter cannot be
considered either by the EPA Administrator or by a reviewing court.
This list of no-consideration proponents includes at least one former
state environmental official, 0 the present EPA Administrator,, 7
and one federal circuit court of appeals. 08 The no-consideration
proponents generally base their position on the mystical divination
105. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1973).
106. Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement Against
Stationary Sources, 89 HARV. L. REV. 316 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bleicher].
107. In St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), the EPA Administrator
found that the Pennsylvania SIP sulfur oxide emission limitation applicable to zinc smelters
was technically infeasible but contended that the Clean Air Act precluded federal disapproval
of the SIP on that basis and subsequently approved the SIP in question. The court found
that the Administrator had authority under the Act to review the SIP, disapprove such plan
if he found it to be technologically or economically infeasible, vacated the SIP approval with
respect to St. Joe Minerals, and remanded the matter to the Administrator for further action
consistent with its decision.
108. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
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of congressional intent by reconciling inconsistent statements made
by various individual members of that 535-member body during the
course of legislative deliberations' ° and, in some cases, statements
made by members of Congress after the Clean Air Amendments of
1970 were passed." 0
Second, the proponents for the position that the Clean Air Act
requires consideration of technological and economic feasibility of
SIP provisions includes participants in the environmental arena
who would be adversely affected by SIP provisions quickly prepared
by state officials largely unfamiliar with much of the industry they
are regulating and ignorant of the impact which the plan provisions
may have upon industry. This list of SIP impact-consideration
proponents also includes three federal circuit courts of appeals.",
Third, it must be noted that the technological and economic consideration issue is complex. For instance, federal courts have held
that the EPA Administrator does not have to prepare an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)"2 prior to approving SIP's"3 or adopting new source
standards of performance" 4 even though NEPA contains no express
language providing such exemption. The basis generally stated for
granting the EPA Administrator such an exemption is because the
Administrator is the grand protector of the environment and would
never do anything inconsistent with this role."' In 1974, the EPA
Administrator, after having achieved his NEPA exemption merely
a year before, espoused the position that he was only a section 110
109. See Bleicher, supra note 106, at 318-25.
110. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 215 n.30, 216 n.31 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd,
96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
111. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Buckeye Power,
Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973). Although the issue was not squarely addressed in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train,
526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975) the Ninth Circuit's holding that Kennecott could be required
under the Act to install continuous emission systems where it was economically feasible to
do so indicates the Ninth Circuit has also found that economic feasibility of SIP controls may
be considered by the court.
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
113. E.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
114. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
115. In finding the EPA Administrator's action in approving a SIP to be exempt from any
requirement to prepare an environmental impact statement with respect to such action, the
Third Circuit, in quoting favorably from International Harvester Co. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973) stated in Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1973) that
EPA-"whose raison d'6tre is the protection of the environment"- is exempt from any
NEPA requirement.
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clerk and without authority to delve into issues such as the technological and economic feasibility of SIP's before approving plans
under section 110 and thereafter enforcing the SIP's as federallyenforceable standards."' In one year, the EPA Administrator had
devolved from the grand protector of the environment who would do
nothing inconsistent with NEPA to a mere section 110 clerk assigned to check whether the SIP would attain the NAAQS, but
without authority to disapprove SIP's which were technologically or
economically infeasible and which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment by way of unnecessarily stringent
regulation which may create economic dislocation, unemployment,
and other adverse environmental consequences. It would seem that
the EPA Administrator cannot have it both ways." 7'
Fourth, if the EPA Administrator cannot consider the technological and economic feasibility of SIP's, very different legal results may
116. See note 107 supra.
117. Congress has removed the EPA Administrator, in part, from the NEPA dilemma he
created for himself by his alternating allegations of grand protector/section 110 ministerial
clerk when it adopted the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15
U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (Supp. V, 1975). Section 7(c) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (Supp. V,
1975) provides:
No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Nevertheless, the Administrator, and all other federal agencies, are still required by section
102(2)(E) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (Supp. V, 1975) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)
(1970)) to: "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses
of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources." Several courts have determined that this section 102(2)(E) duty to
analyze and prepare "appropriate alternatives" is a requirement-distinct from the environmental impact statement requirement of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970)-with which all agencies must comply. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1340, 1341 (8th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1135 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). In essence,
it would appear that NEPA still requires the EPA Administrator to consider the adverse
environmental effects of his Clean Air Act decisions under section 102(2)(E) and act in a
manner least harmful to the environment, even though he has been absolved by Congress of
any obligation to prepare a formal environmental impact statement under section 102(2)(C).
See Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S.Ct. 1462 (1976); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). Any other conclusion would enable the Administrator to engage in activity which
could adversely affect the environment, result in improper commitment of available resources, and pervert the spirit of NEPA-so long as he conducted such activity in the name
of clean air regulation.
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be achieved in the state and federal courts with respect to enforcement of the same implementation plan. Assume, if you will, that the
state environmental agency adopts an unreasonably stringent air
pollution control plan which is technologically and economically
infeasible, is more exacting than that necessary to protect public
health and public welfare, is illegal as a matter of state law, and is
impossible of compliance by a specific source owner. Assume further
that this SIP, which is illegal under state law, is federally approved
by the EPA Administrator and thereafter federally enforceable by
either the Administrator"' or by citizen suit."' If the EPA
Administrator cannot disapprove the SIP because of its technological and economic infeasibility, three different results conceivably
could be achieved depending upon whether the SIP was enforced by
the state, by the federal EPA Administrator, or by a citizen suit.
The state enforcement attempt would result in the SIP being declared illegal under state law. 120 The EPA Administrator might attempt to circumvent certain impossible SIP provisions such as compliance time requirements by allowing the source additional time to
install unworkable pollution control equipment; this might result in
a decision in accordance with this attempt. 2 ' The citizen suit might
result in an attempt and a decision by the court to enforce the SIP
as written-in other words, if technological and economic infeasibility of a SIP cannot be considered upon initial administrative review
or in the subsequent enforcement action, the fact that the specific
source may have to shut down because an inadequate compliance
time period exists for installation of pollution control equipment
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the court to consider.
Finally, it may be that many of the proponents of noconsideration of technological and economic infeasibility of the SIP
are confusing the application of such a no-consideration principle to
poorly conceived air pollution control strategies with the application
of such principle to the basic attainment and maintenance of the
118. Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
119. Id. § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
120. See In re Consolidated Electric Utility Cases, Hearing Panel Report Case No. 73-AP-120 (Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 1974), where the Ohio particulate and sulfur
dioxide emission limitations were found more stringent than permissible under state law and
inapplicable to the electric utilities before the hearing panel.
121. In St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), the EPA Administrator
offered to stay federal enforcement of a SIP provision which he had approved but admitted
was technologically infeasible until the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reconsidered the
impossible plan provision.
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NAAQS necessary to protect public health and welfare.' 2 If a specific source creates a danger to public health in violation of the
NAAQS and there is no control device other than shutdown to remedy this danger, the Act would require shutdown.'2 3 On the other
hand if a source were violating ambient standards necessary to protect the public health in the face of two control strategies, one
possible and the second either impossible or extremely economically
burdensome, and the state chose the second strategy in its hasty
preparation of the SIP,' 4 it would be wasteful to conclude that the
choice of the impossible or extremely economically burdensome control alternative and adoption of such a strategy in the SIP would be
beyond the jurisdiction of either the EPA Administrator or the reviewing court to consider.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently determined under
present law that the EPA Administrator has no authority to consider the technological and economic feasibility of SIP's prior to
federal approval of such plans.'25 Nevertheless, the question of
whether such a defense may be raised in the enforcement context,
or whether a source owner may ever have his day in court to determine the lawfulness and reasonableness of SIP regulation as applied
to such source, is yet to be decided.' 2 ' It is my opinion that the EPA
Administrator should be given both the authority and obligation to
consider patent technological and economic feasibility before attaching federal approval to the SIP,"252 as well as the authority and
obligation to consider actual technological and economic feasibility
of the SIP as applied to a particular source for the foregoing reasons
and for the reason perhaps best expressed by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit:
No such language [to ignore claims of impossibility of compliance with SIP provisions] is contained in the Act, but if
such language is given effect the electric utilities plants in Ohio
122. The court in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 215 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S.
Ct. 2518 (1976), relied heavily on various indicia of congressional intent that technological
and economic infeasibility should not be considered in the attainment of health or ambient
standards. The court then construed this limited ambient no-consideration doctrine as precluding court review of the technological and economic feasibility of the air pollution control
methodology selected by the state to achieve the ambient standards.
123. Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
124. See, e.g., Ohio Air Pollution Control Reg. AP-3-14.
125. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
125.1. See id. at 2530 n.18.
125.2. See id. at 2531-32 (Powell, J., concurring).
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and Kentucky would be closed down and possibly those
throughout the United States. If Congress intended such a farreaching result in the 1970 Amendments to the Act, it certainly
would have mentioned such an intention in the body of the
Amendments.'26
3.

Imposition Of Constant Emission Limitations

A third fundamental problem area with respect to existing source
regulation is whether section 110(a)(2)(B)' 7 of the Act requires the
imposition of constant emission limitations for designated pollutants in the absence of any ambient need therefor. The EPA's position has vacillated. With respect to nitrogen dioxide regulation,
EPA has taken the position that no NO 2 emission controls are required in the absence of any excessive ambient concentrations of
NO 212 and has approved a SIP which ties NO, emission limitations
to apparent ambient need for such control.' 29 Also consistent with
this position was the EPA Administrator's approval of a SIP which
contained a provision providing for tall-stack control of sulfur emissions to attain the prescribed NAAQS for sulfur dioxide.'30 EPA
later reversed this flexible, or ambient-oriented, approach for sulfur
dioxide (but not for nitrogen dioxide) during litigation with the
Natural Resources Defense Council,' 3 ' and thereafter advanced the
proposition that the Act required constant emission limitations for
sulfur dioxide (but not for nitrogen dioxide) under section
110(a)(2)(B) of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA,'3 2 accepted EPA's constant
emission limitation argument-if such constant emission limitations were "technically feasible"-as did the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit-if such constant emission limitations were "economically feasible"-in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train.' Although the Supreme Court in Train' 4 determined that the states
126. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 1973).
127. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970).
128. E.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 16122-23 (1974) (now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.14 (1975)).
129. See, e.g., Ohio Air Pollution Reg. AP-7-01, approved by EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1873
(1975).
130. Ga. R. and Regs. for Air Quality Control § 270-5-24-.02(2)(g) (SO,).
131. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1974).
132. 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1663 (1976).
133. 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1665 (1976).
134. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). For an excellent analysis of the Train decision and what it may portend for the future, see Hardy, Train
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could choose whatever "mix of emission limitations" would achieve
the NAAQS-including, it would seem, flexible, non-constant emission limitation control regulations-the Supreme Court denied certiorari with respect to the Big Rivers and Kennecott circuit decisions on April 19, 1976.'11
The net effect of the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Big
Rivers and Kennecott decisions would indicate that section
110(a)(2)(B) at least favors the inclusion of constant emission limitations in the SIP where such limitations are technically and economically feasible. With respect to EPA's effort to force the massive
installation of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) systems on high-sulfur
coal-dependent electric utilities in the southern, northeast central,
and midwestern portions of the nation, the fact remains that constant sulfur dioxide emission limitations which would require the
installation of an FGD system must be technologically and economically feasible under the Big Rivers-Kennecott doctrine. Inasmuch
as industry has proven three times in the past three years that FGD
systems have not been adequately demonstrated or proven reliable
to the extent necessary to justify their installation to comply with a
SIP constant emission limitation requirement,'6 such FGD systems
remain technically and economically infeasible. To the extent compliance with a sulfur dioxide emission limitation cannot be achieved
through the use of available, low-sulfur coal, SIP imposition of a
constant emission limitation for sulfur dioxide which would require
the installation of an unproven FGD system on existing sourcesand which limitation is unaccompanied by an ambient need for
such low emission limitation-still would seem to be beyond the
power of the EPA Administrator to require under the Act.
4. Summary
The air pollution control flexibility issues such as the propriety
of variance issuance, consideration of technological and economic
feasibility, and constant emission limitation requirements are all
raised in cases involving the government's attempt to force the installation of FGD systems on reluctant source owners. As mentioned
v. Natural Resources Defense Council: The Genesis of a New Era of Federal-StateRelationships in Air Pollution Control, 24 C.Ev. ST. L. REV. 397 (1975).
135. Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA, 96 S.Ct. 1663 (1976); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Train, 96 S.Ct. 1665 (1976).
136.

See note 78 supra.
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above, source owners have established three times in the past three
years that FGD systems have not been demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable to justify their installation on existing stationary
sources. If the Clean Air Act were interpreted (a) as denying the
source owner the right to a variance from an emission limitation
where the variance would not impair the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS, 37 or (b) as denying the source owner the right to
raise questions of technological and economic feasibility of SIP control provisions which are more stringent than necessary to attain
and maintain NAAQS,'18 the source owner would be prevented from
demonstrating the extent of the regulatory "overkill" contained in
the applicable SIP as well as the economic and social costs of such
regulation. Moreover, to deny the source owner access to a forum to
demonstrate these factors would also deprive government of the
value of source-initiated fine-tuning of the SIP for the purpose of
bringing regulatory costs and benefits into some reasonable balance.
IV.

THE CONCEPT OF "No SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION"

One of the most controversial aspects of clean air regulation was
the holding by a federal district court that the language "protect
and enhance"'' contained in the Act's preamble created the duty
to prevent significant deterioration beyond the expressly defined
regulatory requirements contained in the body of the Act. 40 Since
this decision was not overturned on appeal,' the EPA Administrator has had to determine what regulatory scheme these three words
created.42 The Administrator finally issued "no significant deterioration" ambient limitations below NAAQS for individual new
sources," 3 which the EPA admitted were more stringent than necessary to protect public health and public welfare and which were
essentially subjective and arbitrary, and based only on a need to
protect aesthetic, scenic and recreational values. 4 '
137. See notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 105-26 and accompanying text supra.
139. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970).
140. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). See also Sierra Club v.
EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
141. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 4 Env. Rep. Cas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiara
by an equally divided Court sub noma., Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
142. 39 Fed. Reg. 31000-09 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 18986-19000 (1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 2383637 (1973).
143. 39 Fed. Reg. 42510-17 (1974). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01, .21 (1975).
144. The difficulties which EPA had in determining the perimeters of the no significant
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Given the admission that the significant deterioration regulation
is essentially subjective and goes beyond regulation necessary to
deterioration (NSD) concept from the three word ("protect and enhance") mandate is demonstrated by the discussion contained in various EPA-proposed NSD rules. In the proposed
NSD rulemaking of July 16, 1973, the EPA stated:
The basis for preventing significant deterioration therefore lies in a desire to protect
aesthetic, scenic, and recreational values, particularly in rural areas, and in concern
that some air pollutants may have adverse effects that have not been documented in
such a way as to permit their consideration in the formulation of national ambient air
quality standards. Pending the development of adequate scientific data on the kind
and extent of adverse effects of air pollutant levels below the secondary standards,
significant deterioration must necessarily be defined without a direct quantitative
relationship to specific adverse effects on public health and welfare. It should be
emphasized that defining significant deterioration in this way does not imply a judgment by EPA on the question of whether it is sound public policy to define "deterioration" as any increment above existing air pollution levels and to attempt to define
"significant" deterioration in the absence of documentation on the adverse effects
thereof ....
To the extent that the Act provides any basis for defining significant deterioration,
it does so only in section 101(b)(1), which declares that one of the purposes of the Act
is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote
the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population."
Hence, any quantitative definition of significant deterioration must fall between the
levels of zero deterioration and deterioration up to the secondary standards. Any quantitative definition within this range must be essentially subjective, because, within this
range, data are not available with which to quantify any adverse impact on either
public health or welfare.
38 Fed. Reg. 18986, 18987-88 (1973).
In the proposed NSD rulemaking of August 27, 1974 the EPA stated:
As was pointed out in the initial proposed rulemaking, determination of that level
of deterioration which constitutes "significant" deterioration is basically a subjective
decision, because the primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards
are required to be protective of all known adverse effects on public health and welfare
in a nationwide context. Response to the initial proposed rulemaking confirmed that
consideration of varying social, economic, and environmental factors in different areas
would result in varying definitions of what constitutes significant deterioration. None
of the information received during the public comments period would enable the Administrator to justify any but a subjective method for defining when increases in the
concentration of pollutants become "significant."
39 Fed. Reg. 31000, 31001 (1974).
In the final promulgated NSD rulemaking of December 5, 1974 the EPA Administrator
stated:
Since the consideration of "air quality factors" alone essentially leads to an arbitrary
definition of what is "significant," this term only has meaning when the economic and
social implications are analyzed and considered. Therefore, the Administrator believes
that it is most important to recognize and consider these implications, since the consideration of air quality factors alone provides no basis for selecting one deterioration
increment over another.
39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974).
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protect public health and welfare, the fundamental legal question
is how a court can adequately review any standard promulgated
under the concept of significant deterioration. For instance, how
could a court constitutionally approve a standard which goes beyond that necessary to protect public health and welfare? Assuming, arguendo, that such rulemaking is constitutional, what basis for
judicial review exists with respect to a standard which is, by definition, essentially subjective? What legislative limitations apply
under this three-word doctrine which would prevent the Administrator's rulemaking from being an improper delegation of legislative
authority? The difficult nature of these problems is evidenced by
the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Sierra Club v.
EPA,'45 where a panel of the court, deferring to the expertise of the
EPA, found nothing "arbitrary and capricious" about the significant deterioration rules promulgated by the EPA.
V.

RECENT CLEAN AIR LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES

On February 5, 1976, the Senate Public Works Committee approved legislation 4 ' which attempts to provide statutory support in
the Act for the concept of "no significant deterioration" where none
now exists, and which contains delayed monetary compliance penalties (which would exceed the net income of certain companies),' 47
coal conversion extensions, continuous emission limitation requirements, and compliance date extensions. On March 18, 1976, the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee approved its
own clean air bill which also contained no significant deterioration
requirements, excess emission fees, continuous emission limitation
145. 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
146. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
147. Section 9(b) of S. 3219 would add § 120, providing for delayed monetary compliance
penalties, to the Clean Air Act. Basically, this provision would require the owner or operator
of a major emitting facility which was not in SIP emission limitation compliance by January
1, 1979, to pay an automatic monthly penalty sum in an amount no less than the monthly
equivalent of the capital costs of compliance and debt service over a normal amortization
period (not to exceed ten years), operation and maintenance costs foregone as a result of
noncompliance, and the economic value which such noncompliance may have for such owner
or operator. In order to determine what the impact of this provision will be one need only
consider the case of the Ohio electric utility industry. On November 10, 1975, the U.S. EPA
proposed a sulfur dioxide control strategy for the state of Ohio. 40 Fed. Reg. 52410 (1975).
The Ohio electric utilities submitted the following estimated costs of compliance with this
proposed SO, control plan to U.S. EPA on or prior to January 23, 1976:
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INVESTOR-OWNED

FGD

FGD

1975

COMPANY

CAPITAL COST*

ANNUAL COST*t

NET INCOME**

Millions of Dollars
The Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Company
The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company
Columbus & Southern
Electric Company
Dayton Power & Light
Company
Ohio Edison Company
Ohio Power Company
The Toledo Edison Company
TOTAL
•

361

115

49

506

118

64

232

65

42

278
590
512
141

90
136
275
41

41
83
115
35

$2,620

$840***

$429

FGD cost estimates reported by the respective companies to U.S. EPA in response
to the U.S. EPA-Proposed Sulfur Dioxide Control Strategy for Ohio and furnished to
this author.

**

***

t

Net Income figures as reported by the companies in their respective financial reports
and as furnished by the Ohio Electric Utility Institute and furnished to this author.
As reported to this author, this annual cost generally provides for amortization of the
FGD systems over at least a 20-year time period by the respective companies; use of
the Senate bill's 10-year amortization period would increase this annual cost.
Includes capital cost, operation and maintenance cost.

Inasmuch as the delayed compliance penalty is a penalty, it would not represent a tax
deductible expense and must be deducted from net income (even though the penalty sum
expense exceeds income for the Ohio companies by a ratio of 2 to 1). Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Since the penalty sum is automatic-unless the
source owner or operator can demonstrate noncompliance was due to reasons entirely beyond
the control of the owner or operator after posting bond in an amount equal to the potential
liability-the courts are limited in the amount of relief they may be able to provide.
Moreover with respect to utility companies dependent upon government approval of their
rates, there is serious question whether the non-tax deductible "delayed compliance penalty"
could even be recovered from utility rate payers by way of a rate increase. The Supreme Court
recently ruled in NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 96 S.Ct. 1806 (1976) that the Federal
Power Commission (FPC), in establishing utility rates under a rate statute requiring "just
and reasonable" rates, has the duty to prevent a utility from charging rates based upon
illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs incurred pursuant to a violation of law and
resulting penalty sums assessed thereunder. Although the penalty sums involved in this case
were with reference to backpay awards for discriminatory employment practices, the Court
added that the FPC "clearly should treat these costs as it treats any other illegal, unnecessary, or duplicative costs." If disallowance of expenses paid for "illegal, unnecessary, or
duplicative costs" under a rate statute providing for "just and reasonable" rates is required,
it is extremely doubtful that either the FPC, or a reviewing court, would approve a rate
necessary for payment of a "delayed compliance penalty" under a rate statute requiring "just
and reasonable" rates.
This situation begs the question as to how an electric utility will manage to survive where
the expenses incurred as a delayed compliance penalty exceed corporate net income, such
penalty sum is not tax deductible, and such penalty sum may not be recovered from the
company's ratepayers.
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requirements, and compliance extensions of up to five years. 4 '
No clean air legislation was passed when Congress adjourned on
October 2, 1976."' What amendments to the Clean Air Act may be
adopted in the next session of Congress are impossible to determine
at this time.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cost-effective air pollution control method flexibility in achieving
the prescribed NAAQS is essential if the goal of clean air is to be
achieved with a minimum of economic dislocation. Nevertheless,
Congress has responded to the need for flexibility by proposing inflexible significant deterioration controls for new sources which go
beyond that which is necessary to protect public health and welfare
and by proposing mandatory monetary penalties for failure to install unnecessary emission controls by certain dates. It remains to
be seen whether the present federal policy of ever-increasing air
pollution control inflexibility will leave the nation's economy with
the resilience necessary to maintain present employment levels
while creating the necessary new employment opportunities for new
workers entering the nation's workforce.
148.
149.

H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2883 (1976).

